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PART I – INTRODUCTION  
In August 2006, American moviegoers watched as passengers on an airplane 
were terrified by poisonous snakes in the movie “Snakes on a Plane.”1  In May 2007, 
news watchers across the globe were riveted by the true story of an Atlanta lawyer 
who flew from the United States to several destinations in Europe while carrying a 
                                                                
∗
 LL.M. in International Law; J.D. Albany Law School of Union University; B.A. Politics, 
History, New York University. The author wishes to thank Professor Wendy Davis, as well as 
Onchan Inkhamfong and her parents. She is particularly grateful to her father, Dr. George 
Harrington, for answering her many questions regarding infectious disease.  
1 See The Internet Movie Database, Snakes on a Plane, available at http://imdb.com/title/ 
t0417148/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). 
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drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis.2  This event prompted a public outcry against 
the actions of the “tuberculosis traveler,”3 who failed to heed the warnings of various 
local, state, and federal officials.  However, the implications of the tuberculosis 
incident reverberated throughout the aviation, legal, and medical communities in a 
way in which fictional killer snakes cannot.  While few travelers might like to ponder 
it, germs on a plane, and associated issues immediately after disembarking, are a 
more realistic, if less glamorous, threat to the flying public than a Hollywood created 
movie. Although travelers are offered some measure of protection from illness 
through the terms of the World Health Organization’s International Health 
Regulations (“IHR”)4 and the actions of governments and air carriers,5 the 
tuberculosis traveler incident illustrates that there are several areas where travelers 
are protected by neither law nor medicine. 
This article examines two issues which were highlighted by the tuberculosis 
traveler incident and its aftermath: 1) the effectiveness of the current legal regimes in 
international law in stopping the health threat posed by individual carriers of 
communicable diseases who attempt to travel on an aircraft and 2)  the legal 
standards – or lack thereof – applicable to international travelers when their course of 
travel is interrupted because they are deemed to constitute a threat to public health by 
the nation to which they are traveling or at an intermediate point during their travels.  
Part II of this article describes the various applicable international law regimes and 
provisions which govern air travel and the identification, handling, and procedures to 
be used in the event of a suspected or confirmed outbreak of infectious disease.6  
This Part also discusses the forms of infectious disease which concern public health 
experts.  And, several of the infectious diseases which pose a prescient threat to air 
travelers, yet; are not contemplated in the international law regimes applicable to 
public health or air travel.7  
Part III of this article discusses the issue of protecting travelers, and the global 
population at large, from infectious disease based threats posed by individual 
travelers who are carrying a disease at the time of their travels.8  In this Part, the 
author advocates the creation of a public health-based do-not-fly list akin to the 
terror based do-not-fly list currently used by the American government to ensure that 
travelers who pose a threat to public health do not board aircraft or engage in air 
travel until their health status can be confirmed, or they are deemed to be no longer 
                                                                
2 See TB Man ‘Sorry’ Over Plane Trips, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6712281.stm.  
3 In order to shift the focus of the tuberculosis traveler incident from the actions of an 
individual to the actions of the entire system, the author will not refer to the tuberculosis 
traveler by name throughout this article. 
4 See International Health Regulations (2005), May 25, 2005, WHA58.3, available at 
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA58/WHA58_3-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 
2008). 
5 See infra Parts III, IV. 
6 See infra Part II. B.  
7 See infra Part II.A. 
8 See infra Part III.  
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contagious to the general public.9  It is the author’s belief that Interpol’s effective use 
of such a list to track criminals around the globe serves as a better model per se than 
the American do-not-fly list. When used properly, a public health-based list is cost 
effective, a better preservation of the rights of travelers, and poses fewer legal issues 
at home and abroad than does the current vacuum of legality and procedure in this 
particular area.10 
Part IV of this article discusses the issue of travelers who have left their home 
country en route to another country and are denied entry or detained by the 
destination country – or a third party country through which the traveler is to connect 
– on the ground of suspicion of illness.11  Initially, there seems not to be an issue 
under the terms of the IHR, which allows a state to deny entry to any traveler or to 
hold them for observation, testing, or quarantine on suspicion of illness.12  However, 
those are the only rules set forth by the IHR. Issues such as how to safely transport a 
traveler, denied entry on the grounds of illness, and home are not addressed.13  
Further, the IHR regime does not address the rights or interests of State A when its 
citizen is detained in State B on suspicion of illness.14  The pandemic preparedness 
plans used by governments make it clear that, while diplomatic and consular officials 
may attempt to guide State B in its handling of State A’s citizens who are present in 
State B temporarily or permanently during a pandemic, State A has no right to 
dictate treatment or handling of its citizens.15  In a situation where a citizen of State 
A is detained by State B on arrival for health reasons, there is little guidance for State 
A, State B, or the traveler as to State A’s rights outside of standard diplomatic 
protocols.16  This lack of guidance might seem intuitive, and even appropriate, at first 
glance because it allows for situational fluidity and is sensitive to the particular 
complexities of diplomatic relations generally. However, the importance of clarity 
for this issue crystallizes , when remembering the tuberculosis traveler who exposed 
his fellow travelers and airline crew members to a drug-resistant strain of 
tuberculosis, all because he was in diplomatic limbo over treatment and was 
concerned that the treatment he received in Italy would not be equal to that available 
in the United States,17 In this Part, the author argues that simple amendments to the 
IHR regime and the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,18 and on 
                                                                
9 See infra Part III. 
10 See infra Part III.  
11 See infra Part IV.  
12 See infra Part IV. 
13 See infra Part IV. 
14 See infra Part IV.  
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 See infra Part IV.  
17 See US Steps Up Precautions Over TB, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6706437.stm.  
18 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, available 
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2007). 
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Consular Relations of 196319 would clarify these issues and spare future air travelers 
from uncertainty or unnecessary exposure to infectious disease.20  These amendments 
would also reduce the chances of a diplomatic incident, especially in a situation 
where the threat of disease sparks an initial panic.21 
Part V summarizes the issues and arguments made throughout this article.22  It 
concludes that addressing the issues raised is an immediate necessity because (1) the 
frequency of international air travel, (2) the devastation which both global pandemics 
and regional outbreaks of infectious disease have, can, and will cause at a variety of 
levels, and the (3) difficulty of making an informed, well-reasoned, rational and 
diplomatically sound decision regarding any of the issues raised in the middle of a 
crisis, regardless of magnitude. In so doing, travelers will be able to experience 
dangers on an airplane at a movie theatre rather than in the skies. 
PART II – MEDICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Infectious Diseases and Air Travel 
1.  Infectious Diseases of Documented Concern 
Perhaps the most memorable incidence of infectious disease being transmitted 
through air travel occurred with the SARS outbreak in 2003.  Originating with a 
Chinese doctor who treated patients with symptoms of the disease which would 
become known as SARS, the disease spread quickly after this doctor unknowingly 
boarded a plane while infected with SARS himself, rapidly infecting many of his 
fellow passengers.23  The weeks which followed saw cities such as Hong Kong and 
Toronto temporarily suspend air travel in an attempt to isolate the cases of SARS 
located in their jurisdiction and to stop further spread of the disease.24  While the 
threat posed by the 2003 SARS outbreak was contained and air travel as usual 
resumed within several months, SARS has by no means been eradicated as an 
infectious disease.25   
                                                                
19 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, available 
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2008). 
20 See infra Part IV. 
21 See infra Part IV.  
22 See infra Part V. 
23 See Testimony of Mark A. Gendreau, Senior Attending Physician, Lahey Clinic Medical 
Center, Blocking Global Spread of Disease Facilitated by Air Travel Before the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Apr. 6, 2005.   
24 See id.  For a summary of the air travel policies adopted by China—where most 
incidents of SARS infections and deaths during the 2003 epidemic occurred—see 
International Civil Aviation Organization, Reinforce Management to Prevent the Spread of 
Communicable Diseases, A36-WP/196 (Sept. 19, 2007), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/ 
en/ assembl/a36/wp/wp196_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).  
25 See, e.g., Air Passengers Return to the Skies, BBC NEWS, Jul. 10, 2003, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3054925.stm. 
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The majority of international public health and security focus and planning has 
centered on the threat of avian influenza and pandemic influenza.  To date, there 
have been cases of bird to human transmission of the H1N1 strain of avian influenza. 
However the disease has not yet become capable of human to human transmission 
and remains a vector-borne26 illness.27  Since its appearance on an international scale, 
scientists, public health experts, and security analysts have focused on avian 
influenza as an emerging and likely pandemic threat should it reach the human to 
human transmission stage at some point in the future.28  Governments across the 
world have created avian influenza strategies and awareness campaigns, while 
stressing that domestic planning cannot extend to citizens who travel to other states 
outside of standard diplomatic inquiry and suggestion allowances.29  It is important 
to note that developed nations and international organizations have provided 
developing nations, especially those where avian influenza is already prevalent, with 
monetary, health care, and zoological support and infrastructural guidance in order to 
allow these nations to better monitor their avian and human populations for 
infection.30  Despite these efforts, diagnosing avian and human infection with H1N1 
                                                                
26 A vector-borne disease is one which is transmitted to a human being through an animate 
entity, such as poultry in the case of avian influenza or, as discussed below, mosquitoes in the 
case of malaria or dengue fever.  The animate entity which spreads the particular disease is 
referred to as a vector. By contrast, the term phomite refers to an inanimate object – such as a 
door handle – which is necessary to spread disease from person to person through direct 
contact.  
27 See generally World Health Organization, Avian Influenza, available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). 
28 See generally, id. 
29 See e.g., Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairst, North American Plan for 
Avian and Pandemic Influenza (August 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/avianflu 
/91242.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); Gouvernment de France, Grippe Aviarie, available at 
http://www.grippeaviaire.gouv.fr/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (translation of webpage by 
author); Ministerio de Salud (Peru), Conozca Todo Sobre la Gripe Aviar, available at 
http://www.minsa.gob.pe/portal/Especiales/aviar/default.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) 
(translation of website by author); Ministerio de Salud (Gobierno de Chile), Preguntas 
Frecuentas Influenza Aviar, available at http://www.minsal.cl/ici/influenza_aviar/aviar.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (translation of website by author); Government of Singapore, Flu, 
available at http://www.crisis.gov.sg/flu/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); Ministerio de Salud 
(Mexico), Plan Nacional de Preparacion y Respuesta ante una Pandemia de Influenza, 
available at http://www.dgepi.salud.gob.mx/pandemia/FLU-INDEX.html (Feb. 28, 2008); 
Ministerio de Salud (Argentina), Influenza Gripe, available at http://municipios.msal.gov.ar/ 
aviar/ (Feb. 28, 2008); Office Federal de la Sante Publique (Switzerland), Grippe Aviarie, 
available at http://www.bag.admin.ch/influenza/01119/index.html?lang=fr (Feb. 28, 2008); 
Ministero della Salute (Italy), Influenza Aviaria, available at http://www.ministerosalute.it/ 
dettaglio/phPrimoPiano.jsp?id=303 (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); Department of Health and 
Aging (Australia), Avian Influenza, available at http://www.health.gov.au/internet/wcms/ 
publishing.nsf/Content/health-avian_influenza-index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007); 
Department of Disease Control (Thailand), Avian Influenza (Bird Flu), available at 
http://thaigcd.ddc.moph.go.th/Bird_Flu_main_en.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008).  
30 See Robert F. Breiman, Abdulsalami Nasidi, Mark A. Katz, M. Kariuki Njenga, John 
Vertefeuille, Preparedness for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Pandemic in Africa, Emerg 
Infect Dis Vol. 13, No. 10. 2007 Oct, available at http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/10/ 
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is still a time consuming task, and often a final diagnosis is impossible until the bird 
or human has died or is symptomatically at the peak of infection.31  Due to the 
emerging nature of this disease, it is difficult to pinpoint an incubation period for 
avian influenza in bird or human populations.32 
With the knowledge that devastating pandemic influenza epidemics in 1918 and 
1969 would have been far deadlier if air travel had been as prevalent as it is now, the 
international public health community has become increasingly focused on the 
specter of the next outbreak of pandemic influenza.33  On the national, regional, and 
international scales, this realization has sparked the creation of national alliances, 
national and international pandemic influenza plans, and the revision of the IHR in 
the wake of the SARS outbreak.34  However, none of these legal steps pinpoint the 
strain of influenza which will result in a pandemic; if one occurs, if it is likely to 
occur, or if the duration of the influenza strain gives rise to a pandemic.35  As such, it 
                                                          
1453.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (discussing aide programs to Africa in the wake of a 
2006 outbreak of avian influenza in fowl and its limitations). 
31 See World Health Organization, Recommendations and Laboratory Procedures for 
Detection of Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Virus in Specimens from Suspected Human Cases, at 5 
(Aug. 2007), available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/labtests/ 
en/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). 
32 World Health Organization, WHO Guidelines for Investigation of Human Avian 
Influenza A(H5N1), at 4 (Jan. 2007),  available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/ 
publications/influenza/WHO_CDS_EPR_GIP_2006_4r1.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2008) 
(stating that the current estimate for the maximum incubation time for the H5N1 virus is 
estimated to be seven days, however this has not been established as a definite period). 
33 See Ben S. Cooper, Richard J. Pitman, W. John Edmunds, Nigel J. Gay (2006), 
Delaying the International Spread of Pandemic Influenza, PLoS Med. 3(6): e212, at 846-50, 
available at http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371 
journal. pmed.0030212 (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). 
34 See e.g., United States Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2008); General Secretariat for National Defence (France), National Plan for the 
Prevention and Control “Influenza Pandemic,” available at http://www.grippeaviaire.gouv.fr 
/IMG/pdf/plan_national_version_anglaise.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); Government of 
New Zealand, Find Information on Flu Pandemics, available at http://newzealand.govt.nz/ 
record?tid=1&treeid=805&recordid=28127 (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); Government of 
Singapore, Flu, available at http://www.crisis.gov.sg/flu/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); 
Ministerio de Salud (Mexico), Plan Nacional de Preparacion y Respuesta ante una Pandemia 
de Influenza, available at http://www.dgepi.salud.gob.mx/pandemia/FLU-INDEX.html (Feb. 
28, 2008); Ministerio de Salud (Argentina), Influenza Gripe, available at 
http://municipios.msal.gov.ar/aviar/ (Feb. 28, 2008); Ministerio de Saude (Brazil), Gripe 
Influenza, available at http://dtr2001.saude.gov.br/influenza/principal_gripe.htm (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2008); Office Federal de la Sante Publique (Switzerland), Grippe Pandemique, 
available at http://www.bag.admin.ch/influenza/01120/index.html?lang=fr (Feb. 28, 2008); 
Government of Canada, Pandemic Influenza, available at http://www.influenza.gc.ca/ 
index_e.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2008); Department of Health and Aging (Australia), Plan 
for Pandemic Influenza, available at http://www.health.gov.au/internet/wcms/publishing.nsf/ 
Content/ohp-pandemic-ahmppi.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). 
35 See id.  
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is impossible to determine the exact symptoms of or incubation period for a 
pandemic influenza. 
Hemorrhagic diseases are not new to medicine; however, the discovery of 
viciously fatal diseases such as Ebola has brought these diseases to the forefront of 
public health discourse. Transmission methods of hemorrhagic diseases vary, 
however these diseases are similar because they are communicable, especially in 
public and confined spaces such as an aircraft.36  To the extent that there is any 
benefit of these diseases, from a public health and air travel perspective they are 
relatively easy to spot once the incubation period elapses and a patient becomes 
symptomatic.37  However, confirming cases of hemorrhagic fevers, tracing back 
contacts of those who contracted the disease, and quarantine of those with the 
disease are still tedious processes, compounded by the geographical constraints 
found in many areas where such diseases are prevalent.38 
2.  Other Diseases to be Considered as a Threat in Ar Travel 
Largely eradicated in the United States, tuberculosis reemerged as a perceived 
public health hazard to the general public in the days and weeks following the 
tuberculosis traveler incident in May 2007.39  For much of the world, however, this 
disease is as common as it is devastating.40  Symptomatically, it is possible for those 
infected with tuberculosis to go for a long period of time without a diagnosis because 
its symptoms mirror so many other temporary illnesses and because of inadequate 
medical care in many areas where tuberculosis is present.41  Many patients, who are 
diagnosed and seek treatment, remain untreated because of the costs of the necessary 
medications.42  Even then, the fact that a patient is infected with a non-drug resistant 
strain of tuberculosis is not a guarantee that the disease, or an associated infection, 
                                                                
36 For example, as discussed below, dengue fever is transmitted by a particular species of 
mosquito, while Ebola is primarily transmitted through contact with the bodily fluids of an 
infected person. See EBOLA HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available 
at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
Given the use of shared restroom facilities during air travel, and the ability for bodily fluids to 
come in contact with seats and other shared parts of an aircraft, Ebola presents an immediate 
danger to travelers.  
37 See id  
38 See, e.g., EBOLA HEMORRHAGIC FEVER IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO – 
UPDATE 4, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Oct. 3, 2007), available at http://www.who.int 
/csr/don/2007_10_03a/en/index.html. 
39 See US steps up precautions over TB, BBC NEWS (May 30, 2007), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6706437.stm. 
40 TUBERCULOSIS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.who.int/media 
centre/factsheets/fs104/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
41 See Tuberculosis Topic Overview, WEBMD.COM, available at http://www.webmd.com/ 
a-to-z-guides/tuberculosis-tb-topic-overview (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
42 See Addressing Poverty in TB Control.  Options for National TB Control Programmes, 
World Health Organization, available at http://www.who.int/tb/challenges/poverty/en/ 
index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
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will not be fatal to the particular patient.43  The discovery that some forms of 
tuberculosis, such as that carried by the tuberculosis traveler, are drug-resistant, has 
only added to the public health dangers posed by this disease.44  In some instances, a 
person wishing to travel internationally is required to complete a tuberculosis test in 
order to obtain the appropriate visa.45  In terms of infection, tuberculosis is spread 
through person to person contact; such as droplets excreted during a coughing 
spasm.46  Long before 2007, medical researchers were concerned at the possibility of 
tuberculosis being transmitted on an aircraft.  Although the precise findings of 
studies addressing this issue vary, the consensus is that a person infected with any 
strain of tuberculosis is capable of, at the very least, transmitting the disease to 
passengers within three rows of his seat.47 
Whooping cough48 is a disease where most Americans as something are 
vaccinated as a child.  However, it has recently been discovered that the whooping 
cough vaccination administered to children will wear off by the time a person 
reaches their late teens or early twenties, leaving them open to the possibility of 
infection without a booster vaccination.49  Since most patients, and even many 
physicians, are unaware that the whopping cough vaccination wears off over time, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that every year 
approximately one million cases of whooping cough go undiagnosed in America.50  
In other parts of the world, the disease is still prevalent.51  While not as prone to 
fatalities as the other diseases discussed, whooping cough is mentioned here because 
it is debilitating to those who develop it fully, and poses a threat to the lives and 
health of unimmunized children, elderly, and those with compromised immune 
                                                                
43 See TUBERCULOSIS, supra note 40. 
44 See id.  
45 See, e.g., TEMPORARY VISITORS TO THE U.S., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/temp_1305.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
46 See TUBERCULOSIS, supra note 40. 
47 See Diedre T. Hollingsworth, Neil M. Ferguson & Roy M. Anderson, Frequent 
Travelers and Rate of Spread of Epidemics, Volume 13, Number 9 (Sept. 2007), available at 
http://www.2a.cdc.gov/ncidod/ts/print.asp; Ben S. Cooper, Richard J. Pitman, John W. 
Edmunds & Nigel J. Gay, Delaying the International Spread of Pandemic Influenza, 3 PloS 
Medicine issue 6 (Jun. 2006), available at www.plosmedicine.org. 
48 The term “whooping cough” is a colloquialism for pertussis, an infectious disease 
characterized by certain aspects of the cough it induces. See Whooping Cough, WEBMD.COM, 
available at http://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/whooping-cough (last visited Mar. 16, 
2008).  
49 See Salynn Boyles, CDC: Adult Whooping Cough Cases May Hit 1 Million, WEBMD 
MEDICAL NEWS, Oct. 12, 2005, available at http://www.webmd.com/news/20051012/adult-
whooping-cough-cases-may-hit-1-million. 
50 See id. 
51 See PERTUSSIS REPORTED CASES, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at 
http://www.who.int/immunization_monitoring/en/globalsummary/timeseries/tsincidenceper.ht
m (last visited Mar. 16, 2008) (providing data on reported pertussis infections by country for 
the years 1980 – 2006).  
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systems.  It is a disease which frequently goes unnoticed and spreads easily from 
person to person and phomite-based contact.52  In the stages where a patient is 
contagious to the general public, whooping cough could easily present to other 
passengers, crew members, and even health officials screening passengers as an 
aggravated cold or bronchitis and not arouse suspicion as to its true nature until the 
time to control exposure dissipates.  Thus, the author includes this type of infectious 
disease in the discussion because it demonstrates the inability of travelers, aircraft 
personnel, and even many medical personnel to detect infectious diseases of which a 
traveler’s treating physician would stand to have better knowledge. 
Malaria and dengue fever are two examples of vector-borne diseases which 
continue to ravage much of the world’s population.53  For instance, dengue fever has 
reemerged in South America.54  Unlike other vector-borne diseases, such as avian 
influenza, malaria and dengue fever require a specific type of mosquito in order to be 
transmitted from vector to human.55  The threats posed by vector-borne diseases in 
connection with travel are twofold. The first risk is that an unnoticeably infected 
traveler will travel to a place where the required transmitting mosquito is located, 
and transmit the disease to the mosquito after being bitten, and consequently cause 
an outbreak.56   Second, and less explored, is the possibility of passenger infection 
while onboard a flight. Although the IHR regime requires disinfection and 
disinsection of aircraft prior to flight, this does not mean that a flight will be entirely 
free of vectors, particularly airborne vectors which can easily make their way onto an 
aircraft while passengers are being received.57  Once onboard, it is only a few bites 
before a mosquito which previously did not carry malaria or dengue bites an infected 
passenger and goes on to transmit the disease to one or more passengers on the 
aircraft.  
B.  Legal Background 
1.  International Health Regulations 
International health issues have been governed by some type of consensus-
generated regulation since the mid-1800s, when the precursors to the IHR regime 
                                                                
52 See Whooping Cough, supra note 48. 
53 
 See MALARIA, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.who.int/media 
centre/factsheets/fs094/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); DENGUE AND DENGUE 
HAEMORRHAGIC FEVER, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.who.int/ 
mediacentre/factsheets/fs117/en/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
54 Vladimir Hernandez, Dengue Alert Issued in South America, BBC News, Feb. 6, 2007, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6335819.stm. 
55 See Dengue, supra note 53; DENGUE FEVER FACT SHEET, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, available at http://www.cdc.gov/NCIDOD/DVBID/DENGUE/ 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
56 See id.  
57 International Health Regulations, WHO. Part I, art. I. 2005. 
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were created.58  From a voluntary set of principles, the IHR regime emerged as a tool 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) that uses legally bind WHO member states 
and attempts to create parity in and norms for the handling of medical and health 
administration and issues.59  The IHR regime remained largely unchanged for the 
forty years between 1965 and 2007.60  In the aftermath of post-September 11th based 
concerns over the potential use of bioterrorism and the 2003 SARS epidemic, the 
WHO Assembly undertook rewriting the IHR to reflect these concerns as well as the 
possibility of avian and/or pandemic influenza.  The result was the IHR regime 
which the WHO Assembly ratified in 2005 and came into legal effect in June, 
2007.61   
The IHR are a self-executing treaty that became binding on each signatory state 
as of the effective date.62  An exception to the terms of the IHR occurs when the 
signing state adds reservations to the treaty on signing.  In this situation, however, 
the terms of the treaty, which are not subject to reservation, are still binding on the 
reserving state.63  However, like many treaties, the IHR places limitations on 
enforcement mechanisms including prohibiting a state to require that another state 
fulfill its obligations under the IHR other than public condemnation.64 
The 2005 IHR devote much time to air and sea travel-related health issues and 
procedures.65  Associated terms such as travelers,66 affected,67 baggage,68 and health-
related terms,69 are explicitly defined under the IHR.  The definitions of disease,70 
                                                                
58 See Lawrence O. Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the World 
Health Organization’s International Health Regulations, 291 JAMA no. 21, 2623 (Jun. 2, 
2004). 
59 See id.; INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005), World Health Organization. 
International Health Regulations (1969). Third annotated edition, WHO (1983). 
60 See International Health Regulations, WHO. Part I, art. I. 2005. 
61 See STATE PARTIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005), WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/states_parties/en/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
62 CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CH. V art. 22.  
63 See id.  
64 See International Health Regulations, supra note 57. 
65 Id. at Part IV, art. 20.   
66 Id. at Part I (defining a “traveler” for the purposes of the IHR as “a natural person 
undertaking an international voyage”).  
67 See id. (defining “affected” for the purposes of the IHR as “persons, baggage, cargo, 
containers, conveyances, goods, postal parcels or human remains that are infected or 
contaminated, or carry sources of infection of contamination, so as to constitute a public 
risk”). 
68 Id. (defining “baggage” for the purposes of the IHR as “the personal effects of a 
traveler”). 
69 Id.  
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event,71 health measure,72 ill person,73 infection,74 various types of medical 
examinations,75 public health emergency of international concern,76 public health 
observation,77 public health risk,78 quarantine,79 suspect,80 temporary 
recommendation,81 and verification, are particularly relevant to this article.82   
                                                          
70 International Health Regulations, supra note 57, at Part I (defining “disease” for the 
purposes of the IHR as “an illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source that 
presents or could present significant harm to humans”).  
71 Id. at 12 (defining “event” for the purposes of the IHR as “a manifestation of disease or 
an occurrence that creates a potential for disease”). 
72 Id. at 13. (defining “health measure” for the purposes of the IHR as “procedures applied 
to prevent the spread of disease or contamination; a health measure does not include law 
enforcement or security measures”). 
73 Id. (defining “ill person” for the purposes of the IHR as “an individual suffering from or 
affected with a physical ailment that may pose a public health risk”). 
74 Id. (defining “infection” for the purposes of the IHR as “the entry and development or 
multiplication of an infectious agent in the body of humans and animals that may constitute a 
public health risk”). 
75 Id. 
76 INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS, supra  note 70, at 14 (defining “public health emergency 
of international concern” for the purposes of the IHR as “an extraordinary event which is 
determined, as provided in these Regulations: i) to constitute a public health risk to other 
States through the international spread of disease and ii) to potentially require a coordinated 
international [health] response”). 
77 Id. at 14 (defining “public health observation” for the purposes of the IHR as “the 
monitoring of the health status of a traveler over time for the purpose of determining the risk 
of disease transmission”). 
78 Id. (defining “public health risk” for the purposes of the IHR as “a likelihood of an event 
that may affect adversely the health of human populations, with an emphasis on one which 
may spread internationally or may present a serious and direct danger”). 
79 Id. (defining “quarantine” for the purposes of the IHR as “the restriction of activities 
and/or separation from others of suspect persons who are not ill or of suspect baggage, 
containers, conveyances or goods in such a manner as to prevent the possible spread of 
infection or contamination”).  
80 Id. at 15 (defining “suspect” for the purposes of the IHR as “those persons, baggage, 
cargo, containers, conveyances, goods or postal parcels considered by a State Party as having 
been exposed, or possibly exposed, to a public health risk and that could be a possible source 
of spread of disease”).  
81 Id. (defining “temporary recommendation” for the purposes of the IHR as “non-binding 
advice issued by WHO pursuant to Article 15 for application on a time-limited, risk-specific 
basis, in response to a public health emergency of international concern, so as to prevent or 
reduce the international spread of disease and minimize interference with international 
traffic”). 
82 Id. (defining “verification” for the purposes of the IHR as “the provision of information 
by a State Party to WHO confirming the status of an event within the territory or territories of 
that State Party”). 
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The IHR require that aircraft be disinfected and disinsection at certain intervals in 
order to ensure parity in sanitary conditions during air travel.83  They allow receiving 
states to require certain medical documentation from travelers prior to their entry 
into the state.84  Although the IHR regime does not require it specifically, certain 
states, such as the U.S., require airline staff to determine whether a passenger meets 
the fever and other physical manifestation of illness requirements necessary to 
trigger a requirement to inform state officials.85  In the event that a traveler is 
suspected of carrying a disease, the IHR allow receiving state officials to hold the 
passenger for non-invasive tests, observation, quarantine, medical treatment, or to 
deny entry to the passenger.86  Perhaps the greatest innovations of the IHR are the 
extensive provisions addressing the identification, control, and WHO notification 
requirements in the event of a confirmed or suspected outbreak of infectious 
disease,87 the reservation of a state’s ability to restrict or stop air travel in the event of 
an outbreak or pandemic,88 and the creation and use of a passenger identification and 
locator card.89  Once a state informs the WHO that it has a suspected or confirmed 
outbreak of an infectious disease, the WHO then will work with the state, and others 
if necessary, to contain and treat the disease.90  The use of a fluid concept of 
infectious disease triggering WHO notification and intervention is another change 
from the 1965 IHR, which named distinct diseases as being the sole triggers of these 
provisions.91  This fluidity is slightly tempered by the mandatory notification 
                                                                
83 Int’l Health Regulations , supra note 70, Annex 5 at 57. 
84 Id. ANNEX 7 at 59. 
85 See Anne Schuchat, M.D., Acting Dir., Nat’l Ctr. for Infectious Diseases, Ctr. for 
Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., Testimony before 
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Aviation at U.S. House of 
Representatives, CDC Efforts to Prevent Pandemics by Air Travel (Apr. 6, 2005) (transcript 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t050422.html) (blocking global spread of disease 
facilitated by air travel). 
86 INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS , supra note 70; see Part III, Art. 18, at 26; see also Part V, 
Ch. I, Art. 23, at 22. 
87 Id. Part II, Art. 6, at 17. The IHR also require a state to provide notice to the WHO 
within twenty-four hours when it has evidence of a public health risk existing in a third-party. 
Id. Part II, Art. 9(2), at 17.  However, there is a greater amount of time allotted to the 
verification process used by the WHO in the event that there is a potential health issue which 
does not stem from a public health event. Id. Part II, Art. 10, at 18.  
88 Id. Part VIII, Art. 43, at 34.  It should be noted, however, that the IHR regime generally 
seems to disfavor the idea of intense and/or prolonged travel restrictions by a state.  See id. 
This attitude toward travel restrictions makes alternative measures, such as the public health 
do-not-fly list proposed in Part III important to the maintenance of the goals of the IHR 
regime.  See id.; See infra p. 23..  
89 See INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS , supra note 70, ANNEX 9 at 66.  
90 See generally INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS , supra note 70. 
91 See David L. Heymann, Director, Div. of Emerging & Other Communicable Diseases, 
World Health Org., Testimony Before Comm. on Int’l Relations House of Representatives, 
Threat to the U.S. from Emerging Infectious Diseases (Jul. 30, 1997) (explaining the terms of 
the 1965 IHR regime’s definition of diseases which would trigger the provisions of the IHR) 
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requirements for certain diseases; however, outside of a new strain of influenza or 
SARS, the diseases subject to the mandatory reporting requirement are not those 
addressed in this article.92  The IHR explain that the goal of the passenger locator 
card is to allow an airline or state to contact a passenger in the event that it is 
determined that the passenger was potentially exposed to an infectious disease while 
in flight.93 
Concerns over the spread of avian or other forms of influenza, and their 
morphing into a pandemic exacerbated by air travel, permeate the IHR.94  
Importantly for the issues studied in this article, the IHR seem to be implicated 
largely in situations of mass infection which is coterminous and has been identified 
at some level.95  Thus, the IHR are more concerned with a mass outbreak than with 
the potential of an individual traveler to spread infectious disease during the course 
of air travel.  
2.  Regional Organizations 
The IHR represent the agreement of the world health and legal community 
through the WHO Assembly.  Outside of this, however, is a system of regional 
organizations which impact on the way in which a state manages public health and 
travel issues; however, regional organizations generally do not attempt to enter into 
areas of jurisdiction which are claimed by the WHO.   
Although the Organization of American States (OAS) has promulgated, and most 
of its members have ratified, conventions addressing air traffic safety, it has done so 
almost exclusively with the goal of preventing terrorist action involving aircraft, not 
issues of air travel and public health.96  The public health conventions, promulgated 
by the OAS, are largely aimed at the eradication of common and treatable diseases, 
improving the health care and conditions of impoverished citizens of OAS member 
states, and ensuring access to health care in the future.97  Infectious diseases outside 
of HIV/AIDS, pandemic influenza, and avian influenza are not specifically 
addressed by OAS convention or working group.98 
                                                          
(transcript available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa46765.000/hfa46765 
_0.HTM); See Lawrence Gostin, The International Health Regulations and beyond, 4 Lancet 
606 (Oct. 2004). 
92 Notification and other reporting requirements under the IHR (2005), IHR Brief No. 2, 
World Health Organization, available at http://www.who.int/ihr (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).  
The other diseases subject to mandatory reporting requirements are polio and smallpox.  Id. 
93 See INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS , supra note 70, ANNEX 9 at 66. 
94 See generally INT’L HEALTH REGULATIONS , supra note 70. 
95 Id.  
96 See Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, Org. of Am. States (June 3, 2002), 
available at http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/AGres 1840_02.htm. 
97 See, e.g., Seventh Pan Am. Sanitary Conference, Organization of Am. States, Additional 
Protocol to the Pan Am. Sanitary Code , Havana, Cuba, (Nov. 14, 1924), available at 
http://www.paho.org/English/D/OD_308_ch1-3.htm.  
98 See generally Organization of Am. States, available at http://www.oas.org/main/english/ 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2007). 
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Currently, the European Union (EU) is in a state of jurisdictional flux over the 
IHR and the overall public health.  As a regional organization, the EU has no 
membership in the WHO Assembly and cannot make the IHR effective; only states 
themselves may sign and ratify the IHR regime.99  All EU member states have 
ratified the IHR.100  The key jurisdictional issues between the EU and its members 
are notification, interrelation of certain IHR provisions with EU regulations, and the 
ability of an individual EU member state to reserve on the IHR.101  Prior to their 
effective date, an EU Committee issued a memorandum to member states requiring 
member states to commit to notifying the EU prior to or coterminously with the 
WHO in the event of a suspected or confirmed outbreak, in order to meet their EU-
based obligations.102  This memorandum further opined that several provisions of the 
IHR were in conflict with EU regulations and that a memorandum of understanding 
between the EU and member states would be necessary in regards to these provisions 
and the potential for member states to reserve on certain IHR provisions.103  Reaction 
to this memorandum ranges from marked disagreement by the British Parliament, to 
tacit ignoring104 as adopted by most member states when they ratified the IHR 
without a memorandum of understanding with the EU.105  Interestingly, the EU has 
had little policy involvement with the issue of infectious disease and air travel 
outside of general concerns over pandemic influenza and avian influenza.106  Instead, 
member states promulgated their own rules and plans for pandemic or avian 
influenza.107 
Both the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) and Asia-Pacific 
Economic Community (“APEC”) have committees which work to further regional 
coordination in the event of a pandemic or avian influenza.108  The goal of both 
                                                                
99 See CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CH. III ART. 3 (“Membership 
in the Organization shall be open to all States.”). 
100 See STATE PARTIES TO THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005), WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/states_parties/en/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008).  
101 See House of Commons, European Scrutiny Comm., Implementation of Int’l Health 
Regulations, 33rd Rpt. § 5., Session 2006-7, Jul. 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmeuleg/41-xxxii/41-xxxii.pdf. 
102 Comm. of the European Communities, Commc’n from the Comm. to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the Int’l Health Regulations (Sept. 26, 2006). 
103 See id.  
104 See supra note 101. 
105 See supra  note 100. 
106 See, e.g., EUROPA, THREATS TO HEALTH, EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE SYSTEM FOR 
THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASES, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/early_warning_en.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
107 See supra Part II. A. 
108 See TASK FORCE FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION, available at http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_committee_on_ 
economic/som_special_task_groups/emergency_preparedness.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
2008); see also HEALTH TASK FORCE, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, available at 
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organizations is to assure that the economic and infrastructural stature of their 
members is not harmed in the event of any such outbreak, while at the same time 
seeking to promote inter-regional cooperation and assistance in the event of an 
outbreak.109  While APEC pays particular attention to the role which aviation and 
aviation control had in the spread and control of SARS, the organization has not 
directly promulgated rules or agreements addressing aviation and infectious 
disease.110  ASEAN is particularly concerned with the threat of avian influenza and 
with bringing parity to the health care systems of its member states; aviation and 
infectious disease are not stated priorities of ASEAN or its committees.111 
The African Union (“AU”) works extensively with issues of poverty eradication 
and the associated health care issues which relate to poverty.112  Within the AU 
member states and in their interaction with other nations, the demonstrated focus of 
public health concern and policy have been the treatment and prevention of 
HIV/AIDS and the documentation and control of avian influenza in humans and 
birds.113  The AU has not taken affirmative steps to address issues associated with 
aviation and infectious disease.114 
3.  Applicable Diplomatic Protocols and Conventions 
Customary international law establishes the ability of states to conduct 
diplomatic and consular affairs within other states, and extends certain rights, 
privileges and protections to diplomatic and consular staff and foreign travelers.  In 
1961, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations attempted to codify the 
customary international law of diplomatic and consular affairs. In 1963, a further 
convention was created to expand the diplomatic and consular rights, privileges, and 
protections.115  These conventions make it clear that a traveler from State A who is 
                                                          
http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_committee_on_economic/working_groups/health
.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
109 See id.  
110 See TASK FORCE FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, supra note 108; available at 
http://www.apec.org/content/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/emergency_prepare
dness.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); see also HEALTH TASK FORCE, supra note 108; 
available at http://www.apec.org/content/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/health_ 
task_force.html (last visited  Mar. 16, 2008). 
111 See JOINT DECLARATION, SPECIAL ASEAN LEADERS MEETING OF SEVERE ACUTE 
RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS), BANGKOK, THAILAND (Apr. 29, 2003), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/14750.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); see also DECLARATION OF 
THE 8TH ASEAN HEALTH MINISTERS MEETING, ASEAN UNITY IN HEALTH EMERGENCIES, 
YANGON, BURMA (Jun. 21, 2006).  
112 See THE SPECIALIZED TECHNICAL COMMITTEES, AFRICAN UNION, available at 
http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/organs/Specialized_Technical_Committee_en.htm (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
113 See supra Part II. A.  
114 See generally AFRICAN UNION, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/index 
/index.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).  
115 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1961, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2008); VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 1963, see also available at 
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located in State B has the right to contact diplomatic personnel from State A in the 
event of criminal detention.116  Inferentially, these conventions and customary 
international law establish in the diplomatic personnel of State A the right to petition 
the government of State B on behalf of their citizens in the event that a citizen is 
subject to pandemic or other healthcare regulations.117  It may be inferred that such 
rights would also extend to a citizen-traveler of State A who is held by State B for 
health reasons or denied entry to State B.118  However, neither the conventions nor 
customary international law establish protocols for the handling of such situations.119 
PART III 
A.  Backtround Information on the Tuberculosis Traveler Incident 
The tuberculosis traveler incident occurred in May 2007, a month before the 
2005 IHR regime became legally effective.120  The exact details of the incident 
remain a matter of controversy; however, it is clear that, even had the 2005 IHR 
regime been in effect at the time, it would not have eased the situation.  It has been 
determined that the tuberculosis traveler was an Atlanta lawyer.121  The tuberculosis 
traveler was engaged to be married around the time of his diagnosis and had planned 
a wedding in Greece followed by a European honeymoon.122  It is at this point where 
stories differ. Some versions have the tuberculosis traveler being unaware of the 
severity of his tuberculosis infection until he left the country for his wedding.123  
Variants on this story have him asking if he would be able to travel and being 
advised against it but not barred by local, state, or national health authorities.124  In 
another version, the Fulton County health department, in conjunction with the State 
of Georgia and the CDC, warned the tuberculosis traveler that he should not leave 
the country for his wedding and that the appropriate course of action was to 
voluntarily enter into quarantine for treatment.125  Regardless which of these stories 
                                                          
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2008). 
116 See id  
117 
 Id. 
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 See TB patient faces months in care, BBC NEWS, May 31, 2007, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6709289.stm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
121 See id.  
122 See TB man ‘sorry’ over plane trips, supra note 2.   
123 See Exclusive: TB Patient Asks Forgiveness but Defends Travel, ABC NEWS, Jun. 1, 
2007, available at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/story?id=3231184 (last visited Mar. 
16, 2008).  
124 See id.; see also TB patient faces months in care, supra note 120., available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6709289.stm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
125 See id; see also Testimony of Julie L. Gerberding, Director, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services Before House Homeland Security Committee, Jun. 6, 2007, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2007/06/t20070606a.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
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is believed or true, the facts support only that the tuberculosis traveler was able to 
travel to Greece for his wedding, making connecting flights in Germany, then 
venturing around Europe before arriving in Rome, where the US embassy made 
contact with him.126  At this point, the supposition is that the diplomatic officials 
warned the tuberculosis traveler that he was infected with the drug-resistant strain of 
tuberculosis, potentially contagious and suggested that he remain in Rome for 
treatment.127  Reportedly, diplomatic personnel and the tuberculosis traveler’s family 
attempted to secure his flight to the US on a chartered jet.128  Fearing that he would 
be required to stay in quarantine in Italy, and concerned with the quality of medical 
care he would receive, the tuberculosis traveler was able to board a flight offered by 
an American carrier from Rome to Montreal, Canada.129  The tuberculosis traveler 
was again found by US authorities when he attempted to cross the Canadian border, 
apparently because the US government became aware that he was on the flight to 
Montreal and were able to disseminate his name to border crossings.130  This story 
became national and international news when the airlines on which the tuberculosis 
traveler flew attempted to find passengers who might have been exposed to the 
tuberculosis traveler.131  The actions of the tuberculosis traveler, state, local, and 
federal authorities, and the aviation system itself came under intense scrutiny in the 
wake of the story.  The matter became the subject of Congressional hearings in the 
United States, yet to date there have been no major national or international 
measures relating to air travel which have been adopted in the aftermath of the 
tuberculosis traveler incident. 
B.  Implications and Suggestions 
Why should lawyers and public health practitioners study the tuberculosis 
traveler incident? The media frenzy surrounding the incident has subsided, the 
tuberculosis traveler is currently being treated in quarantine, and the state, local, and 
federal agencies claim that they have each learned a valuable lesson from the 
incident.  Studying the tuberculosis traveler incident is not important because of 
these individual components, however; it is important because the same situation 
could happen anywhere in the world and it is possible that no one would be the 
wiser. It is a tragedy which could be repeated with a host of infectious diseases, 
especially those discussed in detail in Part II.A. of this article. It is a tragedy which 
exposes a fatal flaw in the IHR and the international public health system. 
As a regime to combat the prescient threat of outbreak or pandemic involving an 
identifiable and observable disease, the IHR are arguably as appropriate a legal 
solution as could be fashioned under international law in view of the complexities of 
infectious disease diagnosis and treatment.  The fatal flaw in the IHR regime is the 
presumption that an outbreak or pandemic will be readily observable and identifiable 
                                                                
126 See id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See Exclusive: TB Patient Asks Forgiveness but Defends Travel, supra note 123.  
130 See Testimony of Julie L. Gerberding, supra note 125. 
131 See TB patient faces months in care, supra note 120. 
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before or during air travel and that an outbreak or pandemic will necessarily involve 
multiple patients suffering from an infectious disease at the same time.132  Certainly, 
diseases such as Ebola are observable when a patient becomes symptomatic, but 
before this stage it is virtually impossible for a state to quarantine the entire area in 
which a suspected outbreak has occurred.  Beyond this, the IHR regime does not 
clearly envision a person carrying a disease such as drug-resistant tuberculosis, 
malaria, whooping cough, or even influenza to trigger the reporting and protection 
requirements unless he is part of a larger cell of disease activity which has been 
noticed by national officials.133  In regards to air travel and infectious disease, the 
most power the IHR regime gives to states and air carriers is a reporting requirement 
on behalf of the air carrier if a member of its personnel determines that the symptoms 
manifested by a passenger merit further investigation and the receiving state’s ability 
to detain, test, quarantine, treat, or deny entry to a passenger reasonably suspected of 
posing a threat to public health.134  Even in instances where the threshold for IHR 
reporting and containment procedures has been met, the state is only under a 
voluntary obligation to fulfill its commitments.135  By allowing the state to report to 
the WHO within twenty-four hours of reasonable suspicion of an outbreak, the IHR 
regime sacrifices efficiency for certainty and creates the possibility of the suspected 
disease being spread through air travel before it has been confirmed.136 
In a highly publicized attempt to regulate the safety of airline travel after 
September 11th, the United States created what has come to be known as the “no-fly-
list,” a list of persons suspected of having terror or other suspicious connections who 
are to be refused the ability to travel domestically or to the United States by air.137  
This list has had several attention getting gaffes, such as barring United States 
Senator Edward Kennedy from travel,138 however, there has been no argument that 
this list is not successful in its stated goal.  The United States is not alone in its use of 
lists to target individuals deemed to pose a threat to public safety.  One of the best 
known users of such lists is Interpol, which has used criminal and terrorist lists to 
track suspect individuals for years.139  Interpol’s use of lists also alerts states to the 
                                                                
132 See generally INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005), WORLD HEALTH 





137 See QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, available at 
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/secureflight/qanda.shtm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
138 See Sara Kehaulani Goo, Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List, WASHINGTON POST, 
Aug.20, 2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17073-
2004Aug19.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
139 See OPERATIONAL DATA SERVICES AND DATABASES FOR POLICE, INTERPOL, available at 
http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/corefunctions/databases.asp (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).  
2008-09] GERMS ON A PLANE! 313 
identities of persons believed to be potential threats to public security and allows 
them to screen entering and exiting travelers against the list.140   
With this in mind, the author suggests the creation of an international do-not-fly 
list based on public health concerns (public health list), to be maintained by a 
dedicated unit of the WHO, with contacts in every state.  Unlike the terror-related 
do-not-fly list and Interpol’s lists, the placement of a person on the public health list 
would be temporary unless the person’s illness is such that it would require a 
constant bar from public air travel.  The list would not serve as a bar to private air 
travel; such as by chartered jet, provided that the flight crew and any potential co-
passengers were made aware of the person’s health status.  A person would be placed 
on the list when a confirmed diagnosis of infectious disease is made or when there is 
a high suspicion of such an illness.  Placement would be made by the person’s own 
physician or hospital, and the listed person would have the right to a second opinion 
if he believed that the diagnosis was in error.  A person could also be placed on the 
public health list in the event that she lived in, had traveled to, or was otherwise in 
contact with an area of suspected or confirmed infectious disease outbreak.  Unlike 
the IHR regime’s twenty-four hour grace period, a state would be required to list 
places which are potentially or actually affected by an infectious disease outbreak on 
the public health list and all air carriers in the state would be required to screen 
passengers for contacts with the affected area.  A person would be removed from the 
public health list when (1) it is determined by certified medical personnel that the 
person is not infected with the disease claimed; (2) the person has successfully been 
treated for the infectious disease and is no longer contagious; (3) the person 
demonstrates that he has not in fact had contact with the area of suspected or 
established outbreak; and (4) the area with which the person has had contact is 
certified as no longer being the site of an outbreak.   
It in undeniable that this public health list system would cause inconvenience to 
some air travelers, especially when the medical issue occurred close to a scheduled 
flight time or was the result of misdiagnosis.  However, the public health list 
represents a prompt, verifiable method for containing the potential spread of 
infectious disease through air travel at a time when an infectious disease is at its most 
threatening and potentially devastating.  To use the example of the tuberculosis 
traveler incident, if the public health list had been in place, the physician who 
diagnosed tuberculosis of any type would have placed the tuberculosis traveler’s 
name on the public health list and, while agencies and the patient haggled over the 
best form of treatment, the flying public would have been protected from the threat 
posed by this disease.  In another example, the public health list would have barred 
people in the affected area of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from flying on 
the suspicion that there was an outbreak of Ebola in the area.  This might have 
caused an inconvenience to the traveler who was not infected; however, considering 
that over two-thirds of the suspected cases of Ebola were confirmed as such and the 
area was later placed in affective quarantine, this individual inconvenience would, on 
a grand scale, be dwarfed by the illness and economic devastation which could have 
been transmitted had the passenger been infected with the Ebola virus and had 
boarded an aircraft prior to his diagnosis. 
                                                                
140 See id.  
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PART IV 
A.  Scenarios 
Arnold is an American from New York.  Arnold is an architect and has been 
hired to work on a building project in France.  As a child, he received the requisite 
immunizations for children; his parents were Catholic and had no objections to 
medical care.  When Arnold was a teenager, his parents died and he was taken in by 
his aunt, who exposed him to many forms of religion in an attempt to broaden his 
horizons.  Now, he belongs to a religion which regards medical treatment, including 
medical tests of any sort, as sinful.  Because of these beliefs, Arnold has not been 
able to receive the immunizations necessary for him to be able to see the world as he 
has always dreamed of doing; he is particularly excited to go to France because it 
does not require such pre-travel immunizations for Americans.  For all of his life, 
Arnold has been afflicted by environmental allergies.  His friends have urged him to 
seek medical help to alleviate the symptoms; sneezing, watery eyes, a dry cough, and 
flushing, but he has politely declined these suggestions because of his religious 
beliefs.  Arnold is enjoying his business class seat and the in-flight movie when he 
begins to sneeze and cough repeatedly. He assumes that he is allergic to the seat 
covers or his pillow and thinks nothing of it.  Fifi, the flight attendant, notices these 
symptoms and becomes concerned that Arnold is carrying influenza.  She attempts to 
question him and does not believe his assertions that his symptoms are the result of 
allergies.  On arrival in Paris, Fifi informs the French authorities of Arnold’s 
symptoms and her suspicions.  Arnold is then taken to an airport medical clinic 
where the doctors explain that they need to perform routine tests to rule out 
influenza.  Arnold refuses to give consent to these tests because of his religious 
beliefs and asks to telephone the United States embassy. The doctors grant this 
request and the embassy officials attempt to reason with the doctors to no avail.  
Unable to conduct tests, the airport doctors and French authorities decide to hold 
Arnold for observation despite the embassy’s protests and Arnold’s explanation that 
he will be fired if he does not arrive at work in three hours.  Arnold remains under 
surveillance for two days. 
Betsy is a British citizen.  Before her wedding, Betsy decides to do one last thing 
with her friends as a single woman and arranges to meet them in Turkey for a 
cultural tour.  Her fiancé, Bobby, a school teacher, sees her off at Heathrow airport 
and returns home to make some chicken soup because he has caught a cold from one 
of his students.  Betsy is feeling under the weather when she boards her flight to 
Istanbul and castigates herself for not having allotted herself enough time to stop by 
her doctor’s office for a consultation prior to her leaving for Turkey.  Determined to 
enjoy her vacation, she asks the flight attendant for a cup of tea and takes a nap.  
Upon arrival, Betsy sneezes and coughs her way to the front of the customs line.  
Recip, the customs agent, notices Betsy’s symptoms and thinks that she looks rather 
clammy.  He politely engages in a conversation with her while waiting for the 
medics to arrive.  The medics bring Betsy to a room where they explain their 
concerns that she might have a communicable disease. Tired and rather frightened, 
Betsy confesses that she has felt unwell. Unfortunately, her attempts to speak in 
Turkish overstate her symptoms and she is denied entry to the country.  Betsy 
remains in solitary confinement while the Turkish and British authorities attempt to 
resolve the issue of transporting Betsy to England.  Several days later, Betsy is 
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escorted to a chartered jet which flies her to England, where it is determined that she 
has a mild influenza.  
Brenda, Bobby’s cousin and Betsy’s best friend, is scheduled to arrive in Turkey 
for the tour several days after Betsy.  Brenda is a professional photographer and a 
well-known forgetful person.  After having dinner with Bobby and Betsy the night 
before Betsy’s flight, Brenda went on assignment to the Scottish highlands, leaving 
her cell phone in London.  As usual, she fails to inform her family where she will be 
and has never learned to check her voice mail.  Her plan was to fly from London to 
Libya for a quick photo shoot and then from Libya to Turkey to meet up with Betsy.  
By the time she arrives in Libya, Brenda has the same symptoms as Betsy and is 
denied entry as well.  However, a diplomatic argument between the British and 
Libyan governments over terrorism issues has resulted in England recalling its 
diplomatic personnel from Libya.  Betsey is held for observation for several days 
until it is determined that she has a head cold.  She is then allowed to proceed to 
Turkey.  
Jimmy, as he is known to his friends, is a Japanese citizen studying law in 
America.  He returns to Tokyo for the summer to work at a prestigious transnational 
law firm.  Jimmy’s father, a world renowned physician specializing in infectious 
diseases, is very proud of his son and sends him on trips around Asia over his 
vacation so that Jimmy can further his love of travel.  Jimmy’s father receives an 
urgent call from the CDC requesting that he consult on a case and he leaves before 
Jimmy returns from one of his trips.  Jimmy’s mother gives him tickets to Vietnam 
for the following weekend. Jimmy’s mother, also an infectious disease doctor, is 
concerned by Jimmy’s cough but attributes it to too many billable hours.  When she 
says that she would like to visit her sister in Kyoto for a few days, Jimmy assures his 
mother that he will be fine and she leaves.  Jimmy’s cough continues and he feels ill 
but he is determined to visit Vietnam and complete is tour of Asia since he knows 
that he will have to study for the bar exam the following summer.  Being a 
conscientious man, he wears a face mask when he boards the air plane to Hanoi on 
the chance that he might be contagious.  The face mask concerns Vicky the flight 
attendant, who informs Victor the pilot of a potentially ill passenger.  Victor then 
informs the appropriate authorities in Hanoi and Jimmy is escorted to a holding area 
when he disembarks.  The doctors tell him that they believe he has tuberculosis and 
want to quarantine him for treatment.  Jimmy telephones the Japanese embassy 
frantically, pleading with staff to help him arrange for a trip back to Japan.  He has 
no problem with the idea of quarantine, knowing that he will not be allowed to return 
to America for school until he is deemed free of tuberculosis, but wants to be treated 
by his father and mother.  Jimmy’s father promises that he will pay all costs 
associated with his son’s transportation to Japan.  The embassy is in a quandary until 
the Vietnamese government allows a jet chartered by Jimmy’s father to fly Jimmy 
home for treatment. 
B.  Implications and Suggestions 
The above scenarios illustrate the prevalence of air travel and the ease with which 
the inadequacies of the IHR regime and current diplomatic conventions can be found 
in everyday situations.  While the drafters of the 2005 IHR regime accomplished 
their goal of targeting pandemic detection and response with international 
governance and regulation, they did not address individual or even group issues 
which necessarily arise in less dire situations yet are still an issue to air travel, 
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infectious disease control, and diplomatic relations.  Likewise, the Vienna 
Conventions of 1961 and 1963 accomplished the goal of codifying and clarifying 
customary international law in regards to diplomatic and consular affairs but did not 
contemplate the role of diplomatic staff in issues of aviation and infectious disease 
per se.  The faults of the IHR and Vienna Conventions do not apply solely to isolated 
incidents such as those described in the scenarios above.  At the onset of a pandemic, 
there will necessarily be panic on the part of travelers and uncertainty on the part of 
State A and the diplomatic personnel of State B stationed in State A as to how to 
proceed in the event that a traveler from State B is thought to be infected with the 
pandemic disease.  The uncertainty and lack of planning and guidance for such an 
event was personified in the tuberculosis traveler incident, where United States 
embassy officials were uncertain as to the requisite protocol for treating or 
transporting the tuberculosis traveler.  Because of the potential harm to passengers, 
public health, and diplomatic relations, it is necessary for these problems to be 
addressed immediately so that they do not become an impediment in the event of a 
legitimate pandemic event.  It is the author’s belief that two simple amendments to 
existing treaties could remedy the majority of these faults. 
Insertion of language in the Vienna Convention which clearly defines the rights 
of a sending state to contact, counsel, provide medical assistance, and facilitate 
transportation to the sending state would crystallize the rights of sending states and 
the obligations of receiving states.  Such an amendment would avoid confrontation, 
especially during times of tension caused by an outbreak or pandemic, and would 
provide travelers with the assurance that they would not be in limbo while the 
respective governments involved decided how to handle their illness.  This will avoid 
horror stories of detention and illness which could easily undermine international air 
travel and spoil international relations. 
An amendment to the IHR would also clarify the status of travelers and states for 
the purposes of infectious disease and air travel.  Such an amendment should provide 
the boundaries for individual choice of treatment, for example, whether the traveler 
wants to be returned to his country of residence for treatment or to remain in the state 
to which he traveled, as well as a procedure for personnel of the sending and 
receiving state to follow when faced with such questions.  In times of stress and 
uncertainty, it is possible that states will not agree on the appropriate course of 
treatment for travelers who are suspected of carrying infectious diseases regardless 
of the insertion of an amendment to the IHR regime.  Therefore, the IHR amendment 
should include a fast-track procedure for the issue to be brought before the WHO’s 
governing officers for a decision on the best course of action for the individual 
traveler and the public health generally.  This process would be aided by the 
designation of a WHO officer competent to decide such cases at each of the WHO’s 
regional offices.  
These suggested amendments would likely not solve every issue involved in the 
juxtaposition of aviation, infectious disease, and diplomatic relations. However, 
these amendments would solve many of the issues attendent in this juxtaposition and 
would provide guidance for the unexpected situations which can foreseeably arise 
given the nature of infectious disease and the rapidity of air travel.   
PART V – CONCLUSION 
Air travel has truly opened a new frontier for business and pleasure across the 
globe.  It is an essential part of the world economy in many ways and has been 
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instrumental in bringing prosperity and modernization to areas of the globe which 
were previously isolated.  Unfortunately, this interconnectedness brings with it risks, 
including the spread of highly infectious diseases at an unprecedented speed and 
scale.  While the tuberculosis traveler incident has been categorized by some as 
being the result of placing personal interests above public good, it serves as an 
instructive method to evaluate many of the flaws in the current international system 
governing air travel and infectious disease.  As demonstrated above, issues will arise 
even in instances where a traveler does not purposefully travel while ill.  
This article calls for the creation of an international public health do-not-fly list 
akin to those used by Interpol and the United States government as a stop-gap 
measure to ensure that passengers who have been diagnosed with infectious diseases 
or have been exposed to infectious diseases are unable to travel until it is established 
that it is medically safe for them to do so.  This article has also called for 
amendments to the IHR and the Vienna Conventions to clarify the rights and 
obligations of travelers and states in the event of a suspected or established case of 
infectious disease in air travel.  Although such measures could be adopted through 
regional agreements without amending any of these documents, a regional solution is 
inappropriate both because it would not establish uniformity and because most 
regional organizations have shied away from issues involving aviation and infectious 
disease in favor of the IHR regime and WHO actions.   
It would be undeniably naïve to think that law or medicine can create an 
environment in which it is impossible for infectious disease to spread through air 
travel.  By adopting the proposals made in this article, however, the WHO and 
Vienna Convention signatories would substantially reduce the risks of infectious 
disease spreading through air travel.  This would increase the likelihood that the 
flying public will be able to experience fear in the movie theatre rather than the 
cabin. 
